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DISCRETION AND LAW IN THE BRITISH AND IRISH SOCIAL 
WELFARE SYSTEMS
 
By Liam Thornton∗ 
 
Law and Discretion 
The debate on whether a welfare system imposes either a rule based or discretionary 
system, while appearing a simple academic study at first, is one of enormous 
significance for the many hundreds of thousands of people who rely on social welfare 
payments each week to maintain subsistence. Imagine the decision of whether a 
person could eat, cloth herself or pay the rent being held by one individual. Imagine 
further, a person who does not reach the required legislative requirements for a given 
welfare payment, suffering insurmountable hardship because of this legislative 
provision. Both these examples are at the extremes of the discretion versus law 
debate; however it serves to remind us that one, without the other, may have potential 
disastrous consequences for an individual. This paper shall outline the arguments for 
and against both systems, and give examples of how relying on either law or 
discretion independently has resulted in perplexing results.  
 
Discretion and Theory 
“Where law ends discretion begins, and the exercise to discretion may mean either 
beneficence or tyranny, justice or injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness”1. 
Titmuss regards a complete reliance on discretion in welfare law as a “reversion to a 
mass ‘poor law’ age”2 but maintains the necessity of discretion as essential to give 
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flexible responses to the myriad of individual circumstances. Titmuss sees the 
essential issue in welfare systems as getting the right balance between rules and law 
on the one hand and discretion on the other. However Donnison views discretion as “a 
rank weed”3 that submerges the welfare service. He feels that discretion leaves 
claimants uncertain about their welfare entitlements4. Donnison regards tightly 
regulated discretion as the key to dealing with welfare claims and ensuring fairness, 
consistency and confidence in the welfare system5. Alder and Asquith feel that 
“[L]egal control over the exercise of discretionary powers….ignore the 
relationship….[with] the wider social, political and economic order”6. Both see 
discretion as having problems of arbitrariness, inequality and, at times, failing to meet 
the most basic requirements of justice. However, they note that a strict adherence to 
rules gives rise to inflexibility, insensitivity and rigidness as to individual 
circumstances.  
 
Dworkin sees the institution of rights as representing “the majorities promise to the 
minorities that their dignity and equality will be respected”7. Gilligan argues that the 
“very coinage of rights is debased by discretion”8. However, Harris approaches the 
question from the view that some discretion “must inevitably characterise welfare 
provision”9, given the fact that the denial of a payment may be of such a serious 
matter for the individual involved, to ensure the necessary flexibility which strict rules 
                                                 
3
 Donnison, D The Politics of Poverty (London: Oxford Verbatim Ltd., 1982) p. 90. David Donnison 
was Chairman of the Supplementary Benefits Commission in the United Kingdom (U.K) from 1972 
until it was abolished in 1980. 
4
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5
 Ibid. p. 98 
6
 Alder, M & Asquith, S (Editors) “Discretion and Power” in Discretion, Justice and Poverty (London: 
Heinemann Educational, 1981) p.10 
7
 As quoted in Harris, N Social Security Law in Context (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000), p. 
34.  
8
 Ibid. p. 35 
9
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cannot provide. However the underlying emphasis of the “rules” versus “discretion” 
conflict remains, namely, nobody can claim as a right that a discretionary power 
should be exercised in his favour. With such conflicting views from eminent welfare 
academics, the question of interaction of law and discretion is one that must be 
considered. In Ireland, there has been little discussion on the use of discretion 
regarding the discretionary payment of supplementary welfare allowance. However, 
in Britain a far more wide ranging debate, has taken place on the inter play between 
law and discretion in welfare provision. The U.K. has experimented with the varying 
extremes of rules and discretion and in this regard, can act as a comparator with the 
less transformative Irish welfare system.   
 
II 
Discretion and Law: The British Experience 
 
In the United Kingdom (U.K.) a far more wide ranging debate has taken place on the 
inter play between law and discretion. The U.K. moved from rule guided discretionary 
system and while shifting towards a rigid, rule based structure, experimented with 
absolute discretion, until finally settling on a discretionary, rule based and cash 
limited welfare system.  
 
Supplementary Benefit:  Discretion, Discretion, Discretion? 
Prior to 1980, the Supplementary Benefit Commission (SBC) paid Supplementary 
Benefit (SB)10 as a matter of discretion. Basic supplementary benefit was paid to 
those who did not satisfy contributions or other conditions for insurance based 
                                                 
10
 As outlined in the Ministry of Social Security Act 1966 (as amended), Supplementary Benefit 
consisted of social assistance payment, corollary to Ireland’s unemployment assistance, Emergency 
Need Payments (ENP) and Emergency Circumstance Additions (ECA), which are corollary to Ireland’s 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance (SWA) under sections 180-182 of the Social Welfare 
(Consolidation Act) 1993. 
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benefits. Along with this, almost half of all SB claimants were also entitled to 
Emergency Need Payments (ENP), or Emergency Circumstance Additions (ECA)11. 
The power to award ENP and ECA were discretionary in nature and the uses of the 
grants were defined by regulation. ENP included payments for clothes, bedding, 
fridges etc. while ECA paid for heating costs, special dietary requirements, travel 
costs etc. “[I]ndividual hardship and need” along with “reasonability” were the 
criteria for the granting of an award12. In Supplementary Benefits Commission v. 
Clewer13 Stabb J. stated that there is no precise definition of the word “need” but 
“exceptional need” must be one to avoid hardship and each case must be examined as 
to the particular circumstances of the applicant. 
 
Donald Donnison, the then Chairman of the SBC, stated that the adequacy of the basic 
allowances should be examined given the huge numbers requiring ENP14. Donnison 
saw the growing reliance on discretionary add-on payments by recipients, within the 
United Kingdom Supplementary Benefit payments system, as arising out of the moral 
judgements made by welfare officers to the neediness of the cases at hand15. 
Donnison also noted the growing amount of the SBC budget that had to be spent on 
administrative appeals for refusal of the add-on payments and ponders whether 
claimants themselves were happy with the level of discretion that was prevalent in the 
welfare service16. Appeals for ENP and ECA were regarded as “something of a 
lottery”17.  
                                                 
11
 Supra. fn. 7 at p. 110 
12
 Supplementary Welfare Handbook (1972 edition) paragraph 88 
13
 Queens Bench Division, 17th May 1979, as outlined in Harris supra. at p. 109 
14
 Donnison D. “Supplementary Benefits: Dilemmas and Priorities” 1976 5(4) Journal of Social Policy 
pp. 337-258 at p. 348 
15
 Ibid. p. 350 
16
 Ibid. p. 349 
17
 Supra. fn. 7 at p.110 
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The Family Fund: A Discretionary Step Too Far? 
The family fund, according to Bradshaw18 was “an ad hoc response to political 
circumstances”19 and this knee-jerk reaction came to be seen as an experiment in 
welfare administration and discretion. The Conservative government allowed the 
Joseph Rowentree Memorial Trust to govern this innovative new scheme so as to 
enable the fund to be “generous and imaginative”20. What made the Family Fund so 
unique and exciting was that it was operated by professional social workers who used 
their judgement flexibly to benefit as far as possible families with disabled children. 
Social workers, as well as being the ultimate decision makers in relation to the 
resources allocated to a family, found themselves acting as advocates on behalf of the 
families and encouraged them to think of innovative ways to relieve the burdens of 
caring for a severely disabled child. 
 
The generosity and individual uniqueness of some of the grants called into question 
the equitable nature of the Fund. Bradshaw states that evidence was produced to show 
that more articulate families received larger grants than those families whose 
aspirations were low21. To ensure the continued operation of the system, “individual 
and private discretion”22 had to be constrained. While the Fund did not become “rule 
based” it did become more “rule guided”. The Family Fund Panel, who reviewed the 
decisions of social workers, began to decide on what could and could not be given. 
                                                 
18
 Bradshaw, J. “From Discretion to Rules: The Experience of the Family Fund” in Discretion, Justice 
and Poverty pp. 135-147 
19
 Ibid. p. 139- A number of British newspapers had begun to highlight the plight of the Thalidomide 
babies and daily struggles of their family which led to the setting up of the Family Fund.  
20
 Ibid. p 137 
21
 This would seem to suggest, although rather cryptically, that middle class families benefited much 
more than those who were working class.  
22
 Ibid. p. 147 
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This limited the Fund’s staff in allocating innovative grants or aids. At the same time, 
given the large volume of cases that had to be processed, the more “routine cases” 
were passed on to administrative staff rather than social workers to deal with. To 
maintain public confidence, internal guidelines were developed to ensure a degree of 
fairness and equity in the system. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the level of 
discretion within the system was constrained due to budget limitation.  
With the increasing rigidity of the system, social workers began to leave and the 
uniqueness of the Family Fund diminished. As a result the innovativeness and 
creativity of the Fund was diminished. The failure of this initiative pointed out the 
stark realities of unfettered discretion. It may have been this failure that led to 
subsequent curtailing of discretion in other areas of British welfare law.  
 
Goodbye Tyranny; Hello Rules: The Social Security Act, 1980 
After a review of the social security system the Conservative government bought in 
the Social Security Act 1980, which enumerated every circumstance, to which 
additions could be made to single weekly payments and when once off payments 
could be granted. In response to criticisms of SB, the SBC was abolished and the 
Social Security Act 1980 introduced numerous detailed and regulatory provisions, 
which gave payments as a right and enumerated the exact conditions of payment. 
Entitlement to ‘single payments’ (which replaced ENP) and exact conditions for 
additions to weekly benefit were enumerated in legislation and regulation. However 
Posser questioned whether the discretion that existed in the SBC really allowed for 
“individualised justice” given the “highly restrictive and complex body of rules” that 
existed23. Lustgarten surmises that the bureaucratic SBC “operated by prescribing 
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 Posser, T. “The Politics of Discretion” in Discretion, Justice and Poverty , 149 
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rules of varying flexibility and applying them in appropriate instances”24. This led to a 
degree of control in the expenditure, and attempted to ensure territorial uniformity. 
The 1980 Regulations broke down a beneficiary’s requirements into those that were 
“normal”25, “additional”26 and “housing”27. Strict formulae were set out 28 in order for 
a claimant to be legally entitled to receive the payments. Only slight residual 
discretion remained29. The primary reason for the introduction of the Social Security 
Act, 1980, was to curb welfare expenditure, which the Thatcher government partly 
blamed on the level of discretion within the supplementary benefits system30. As it 
turned out, this move was to be a magnificent failure. Between 1980 and 1986 there 
was a 538% increase in single payments31.  
In response to the unsatisfactory nature of the 1980 Act and the projected benefit that 
failed to materialise from a regulated, as opposed to a discretionary system, the 
Conservative government abolished supplementary benefit and the Social Fund was 
introduced. 
 
The Discretionary Social Fund: Discretion, Rules and Budgets: All just a little bit 
of history repeating? 
Berthound has described the discretionary social fund as “long on desirable 
objectives- help, sympathy, flexibility and so on- but very short on methods of 
                                                 
24
 Lustgarten, L. “The New Legislation-II: Reorganising Supplementary Benefit” January 22nd, 1981 
New Law Journal pp. 95-97 at p. 95 
25
 This is the basic scale rate applying to those not in employment and without insurance contributions. 
26
 This would have being ENP under the 1966 legislation and regulations. 
27
 This refers to rent or mortgage interest repayments. 
28
 Supplementary Benefit (Requirements) Regulations 1980 (S/I 1980/1299) 
29
 Under the 1980 Act a single payment could have been made in order to avoid a “serious risk” to an 
individual’s health and safety.  
30
 The late 1970’s was also a time of a severe economic crisis and the Tory government needed to 
maintain fiscal policy. This was achieved by cutting social security benefits. Throughout this period 
tabloid newspapers in Britain, like the Daily Mail and The Sun, ran stories of the unemployed ‘living in 
luxury’ on state support. It is perhaps interesting to note that these two papers continue to write stories 
on the alleged life of luxury of those who need social security, however in the 21st century, asylum 
seekers and refugees are the targets.  
31
 Mullen, T. “The Social Fund – Cash Limiting Social Security” [1989] 52 M.L.R. 64 at p. 66 
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achieving those objectives”32. Some saw the Social Fund as representing “a redrawing 
of the line between regulation and discretion”33. Rowe regarded this cash-limiting 
policy as sitting “comfortably within the New Right philosophy of markets, flexibility 
and choice”34 arguing that the language of used in the social fund, which emphasises 
budgetary limits as being that familiar to economists and not welfare activists. The 
fixed budget placed on the fund would “act as a real constraint on the exercise of 
creative discretion”35.  
 
The Social Security Act 1986 introduced Income Support, which was to cover basic 
minimum cost of living for a claimant who did not have any other income. Other 
fixed and regulated social fund payments outlined by statute remained- maternity 
expenses, funeral expenses36 and cold weather heating expenses37, were payable as a 
right and not subject to the constraints of the discretionary social fund. The 
discretionary fund could be described as an exercise in budget limitation given that 
two out of the three payments it provided were in the form of repayable loans rather 
than grants. Community Care Grants are awarded in only four situations38 mainly 
involving resettlement into a community of prisoners, the mentally ill or disabled or 
for relieving exceptional pressures. This grant can only be paid to those individuals 
who receive income support and this grant does not have to be repaid. Evidence 
suggests that the main recipients of the grant are the elderly and old age pensioners 
rather that lone parents or the unemployed. Rahilly questions whether this is because 
                                                 
32
 Berthoud, R. “The Social Fund- Is it Working?” 1991 12(1) Policy Studies pp 4-25 at p. 11 
33
 Rowe, M. “Discretion and Inconsistency: Implementing the Social Fund” 2002 Oct-Dec Public 
Money & Management pp. 19-24 at p. 20 
34
 Ibid.  p. 19 
35
 Supra. per Harris fn.7 at p. 133 
36
 Social Fund Maternity and Funeral Expenses Regulations 1987  
37
 Social Fund Cold Weather Payment (General) Regulations 1988 
38
 Supra. per Harris fn. 7 pp. 132-133 
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Social Fund Officers (SFO) are using their discretion in making moral distinctions 
between those who they deem “deserving” and those who are “undeserving” and who 
may be deemed as “scroungers”39. Crisis Loans are paid in emergency situations, 
where it is not necessary to be receiving income support and mainly to cover 
situations arising from flood, fire or natural disasters. The final payment, Budgeting 
Loans were introduced to iron out the supposed inequity in that those who work have 
to take out loans to buy items like fridges, beds etc. while those on welfare are 
provided with them without charge. Discretionary social fund decisions can only be 
appealed by way of an internal office review and then finally to a Social Fund 
Inspector (SFI). In the year 1998-1999, 60% of original decisions were confirmed, 
while 38% were substituted for a verdict in favour of the welfare beneficiary40.   
 
It is worthy to note that there is no legal entitlement to the grant or loans. With regard 
to the making of the loans the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) 
Office must have regard to the amount of resources that the office has at its disposal, 
any outstanding loan the applicant may have, the length of time he/she has been on 
benefit, the size of the family in question and the possibility of loan repayment41. 
Lawston and Walker42 have pondered the possibility of budget constraints leading to 
territorial and temporal inequity. Similar applications may be treated differently in 
offices due to the area that the application has been made in. Those in socially 
deprived districts may finds it hard to get loans due to budgetary constraints, while 
                                                 
39
 Rahilly, S. “Social Security, Money Management, and Debt” in Harris, N. Social Security Law in 
Context (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000) pp. 431- 459, 449. 
40
 Supra. fn. 39 at p.456-457 
41
 s. 71 Social Security Act 1998 
42
 Walker & Lawton “The Social Fund as an Exercise in Resource Allocation” [1989] 67 Public 
Administration pp. 295-317 
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those in more affluent areas may not have such problems43. Similarly, at different 
times of the year, offices may be hard pressed to give loans or grants to deserving 
applicants due to budgetary constraints. As has been noted44 under a purely 
discretionary system, neither extent of need nor overall expenditure can be known. 
The result of such a budgetary constrained discretionary system can be hostile and 
unresponsive to applicants needs. As Rowe45 suggests, all the discretionary fund is 
attempting to do is mediate between competing claims and exercise their discretion 
(or moral judgement?) as to who may be deserving of relief. Given the evidence that 
the unemployed and lone parents are most likely to be reliant on loans, it is alarming 
to think that a person may be excluded from receiving a loan due to their inability to 
repay.  
 
The British experimentation between law and discretion at various extremes of the 
welfare system shows the inherent difficulty in striking the correct balance. Rahilly 
notes with regards to the current system “[T]he framework of discretion and fixed 
budgets results in unfairness…whilst the inadequacy of benefits merely extends the 
indebtness of those who are successful”46 Walker and Lawton feel that the result of a 
discretionary system of supplementary benefit from the 1960’s to the highly legalese 
regulations of the 1980 Act back to a discretionary based but budgetary controlled 
system has “transformed a scheme posited on creative justice into one of proportional 
justice”47.  
 
                                                 
43
 Supra. fn. 31. Mullen, who at page 79 gives the example of Bognor Regis who received 166% of its 
previous expenditure under the 1980 Act and Bathgate, a socially deprived community, who got 34% 
of their previous expenditure.  
44
 Supra. fn. 41 at p. 300 
45
 Supra. fn. 33 at p. 22 
46
 Supra. fn. 39 at p. 459 
47
 Supra. fn. 41 at p. 313 
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III 
Discretion and Law: The Irish Experience 
The Irish Welfare System: Discretionary Beginnings48 
The Irish welfare system has its origins in the British Poor Law. The Poor Law was 
established nation wide by mid-1840 and provided cash supports, benefits-in-kind, 
soup kitchens and workhouses to those in dire need, however was unable to prevent 
the Great Famine of 1845-1850. With the establishment of Home Rule, the Local 
Government (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923 transposed the British Poor Law 
system, with slight modifications, onto the Irish Free State. Local Authorities were to 
establish nationwide schemes to provide support for those who could not provide for 
themselves. The Poor Law adopted the guise of “Home Assistance” under the Public 
Assistance Act, 1939, but in substance, it had not changed.  
 
The Poor Law was based on absolute discretion. In O’ Connor v Dwyer49 four paupers 
sought a declaration that they were entitled as a matter of right to receive from the 
defendants (who were Guardians of the Poor of the Dublin Union) due relief from 
poverty. In the High Court, Meredith J. held, that under the Poor Law Acts 1838-
1847, the plaintiffs, once they had applied for assistance and were found to be 
destitute (which was not disputed by the defendants) they had a right of due relief and 
the Guardians had an obligation to provide it, although the provision of that relief was 
for the Guardians to decide50. However, the Supreme Court, by a 2-1 majority, 
reversed the High Court decision. The Court held that on the true construction of the 
Poor Law Acts the Court was not entitled “to reverse a decision bona fide arrived at 
by the Board of Guardians, whether as to the applicants’ right to relief or as to the 
                                                 
48
 For a full discussion on the historical beginnings of the Irish Welfare System see Cousins, M. The 
Birth of Social Welfare in Ireland 1922-1952, Four Courts Press, Dublin 2003) 
49
 (1932) IR 466 
50
 Ibid. p. 477 
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amount granted”51. Over the years legislative provisions were set up to provide for 
many payments as a right, however even today, discretion remains in a modernised,  
rule guided and  more generous form, as supplementary welfare allowance. 
 
 
Rules and Irish Welfare Payments: We Follow the Law Around Here! 
Like all welfare systems, many (if not most) payments are based on fixed rules, set 
out in legislation or statutory instruments, which tell a recipient what welfare payment 
(if any) they are entitled to. In this regard, child benefit52 is the one universal payment 
that exists for all parents of a child or children. However, the universal nature of the 
child benefit payment is not reflected in any other social welfare provision. Payments 
like unemployment benefit53 and unemployment assistance54 family income 
supplement55 and one parent family payment56 along with the various strands of 
disability payments and pensions are subject to regulated criteria and set rates, where 
if a claimant does not meet the set statutory or regulatory criteria, he will be rejected 
and no residual discretion exists to grant the payment. These payments strive to 
ensure a basic minimum income to which all should be entitled. However there is 
recognition that these payments by themselves may not be adequate given the myriad 
of circumstances and hurdles faced by a diverse group of individuals in a “one glove 
fits all” type of scheme. It is for this reason that supplementary welfare allowance 
exists alongside legislative payments to ensure that all maintain an income above a 
certain subsistence level.   
                                                 
51
 Ibid. p. 491 
52
 Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993, ss. 192-196 (hereinafter the 1993 Act or SW(C)A 1993) 
53
 SW(C)A 1993 ss. 42-48 
54
 SW(C)A 1993 ss. 119-126 
55
 SW(C)A 1993 ss. 197-203 
56
 Social Welfare Act 1996 s. 17 which inserted ss. 157-162 into the SW(C)A 1993 
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Discretion in Ireland: Supplementary Welfare Allowance 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance (SWA) is administered by the Health Boards on 
behalf of the Department for Social and Family Affairs (DSFA). Internal guidelines of 
the DSFA outline the rationale behind SWA57 as providing a residual and support role 
within the overall income maintenance structure, to provide immediate and flexible 
assistance to those in need who do not qualify for other state schemes, to guarantee a 
basic minimum income and to provide those with low incomes support to meet their 
needs on a day to day basis or in emergency situations. 
Subject to specific exceptions58, “every person in the State whose means are 
insufficient to meet his needs and the needs of any adult or child dependant of his 
shall be entitled to supplementary welfare allowance”59. The SWA (which has always 
been budget constrained) is subject to a means test60 and can be inter alia a weekly 
payment61, a weekly or monthly supplement62, a rent supplement63or a mortgage 
interest supplement64. The amount that a person is “entitled” to “is the amount by 
which his means fall short of his needs”65 subject to the needs and maximum payment 
formula set out in the 1993 Act and Regulations. Before SWA is granted, a person 
must be living in the State and the health board, if it wishes, may require a person to 
be registered for employment66 and/or have made an application for other social 
                                                 
57
 See http://www.welfare.ie/foi/swa.html (Last viewed on February 28th, 2005)  
58
 Students, those in full time remunerative employment and those involved in trade disputes are 
excluded from claiming SWA. However s.183 of the 1993 Act provides that an emergency payment 
may be made to any of the above categories in exceptional circumstances. 
59
 s. 171 SW(C)A 1993 
60
 Part III of the Third Schedule of the 1993 Act 
61
 s. 178 SW(C)A 1993 
62
 s. 179 SW(C)A 1993 
63
 Social Welfare (Consolidated Social Welfare Acts) Regulations 1995, Article 3 
64
 Ibid. Article 10. Schemes such as the Back to School Allowance and asylum seeker direct provision 
payment are also paid out under the SWA scheme. 
65
 s. 177 SW(C)A 1993 
66
s. 176(a) SW(C)A 1993 
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welfare benefits that they may be entitled to67 but that person does not have to seek 
out charitable assistance. The health board may, in any case it considers reasonable, 
pay SWA to any person by way of a single payment to meet an exceptional need68. 
Departmental guidelines give examples of special clothing, cooking utensils or costs 
relating to funerals or visiting relatives in hospitals or prisons as constituting 
exceptional need69. Section 182 of the 1993 Act gives the health board the residual 
power to disregard the section 171 and 172 exclusions and pay SWA in an urgent 
case. This right may apply to those who suffer flooding or domestic fires and applies 
also to those not normally entitled to SWA. Benefits can also be paid in kind 
“wherever it appears to the health board by reason of exceptional circumstances the 
needs of a person can be best met by the provisions of goods or services…the health 
board may determine that such goods or services be provided for him under 
arrangements made by the board”70. Section 267 of the 1993 Act71 provides a method 
of appealing against a negative determination by the health board. The usual 
procedure is to get a health board official (other than the official who decided upon 
the first determination) to review the case. The SWA Appeals Regulations72 are silent 
as to the right of an oral appeal. Decisions on the SWA payment and supplements 
(sections 177-179 of the 1993 Act) can be appealed to the Social Welfare Appeals 
Office73. The right of appeal does not extend to exceptional needs payments. Cousins 
states that this is due to their discretionary nature74. 
 
                                                 
67s. 176(b) SW(C)A 1993 
68s. 181 SW(C)A 1993 
69
 Cousins, M. Social Welfare Law (Thomson Roundhall, Dublin, 2002) at p.153 
70
s. 180 SW(C)A 1993 
71
 Supra. fn. 69 pp. 333-335 for a full examination of the SWA appeals system. 
72
 Social Welfare (Consolidated Supplementary Welfare Allowance) (Amendment) (Determination and 
Appeals) Regulations 1998 (S/I No. 107 of 1998)  
73
 s. 30 Social Welfare Act, 1996. 
74
 Supra. fn. 69 at p. 334 
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Administrative law protects the exercise of health board discretion and this discretion 
must be exercised freely and without interference, real or perceived, from any outside 
individual or body75. In the State (Kershaw) v. Eastern Health Board76 a ministerial 
circular purported to exclude all those on “temporary unemployment benefits” from 
receiving fuel allowance under SWA. Finlay P. held that while the Minister for Social 
Welfare had authority to make regulations under the Social Welfare Acts, the absolute 
exclusion of a whole category of people in the prosecutrix’s position without 
consideration of her means was ultra vires the Minister and not provided for under 
social welfare legislation. The Minister had unlawfully fettered the discretion of the 
health board. 
  
 
However, although a Minister may not fetter the Health Boards discretion, it appears 
that a Health Board itself may limit the use of its discretion as it sees fit. In Murphy v 
Eastern Health Board77 the applicant’s claim for SWA was refused. Ms. Murphy had 
not being in receipt of any income for a three-year period. Eventually, she was given 
an amount of SWA less than the maximum. The health board had refused to pay the 
applicant SWA because she had voluntarily left her job and had not registered as able 
to take up employment. The health board had decided that the fact that Ms. Murphy 
had left her job to look after both of her elderly parents was not a consideration to be 
factored in making their decision. Section 206 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) 
Act 198178 said the health board may refuse an applicant who had not registered for 
employment. O’ Hanlon J. held that the health board had no option but to refuse the 
                                                 
75
 In general see Morgan, D & Hogan, G Administrative Law in Ireland (Roundhall Sweet and 
Maxwell, Dublin, 1998) 
76
 (1985) ILRM 235 
77
 An ex tempore decision given by O’ Hanlon J. reported in the Irish Independent, 4th August 1988 as 
outlined in Whyte, G. Social Inclusion and the Legal System: Public Interest Law in Ireland (Institute 
of Public Administration, Dublin, 2001) p. 157 
78
 Now s. 176 of SW(C)A 1993 
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application. Whyte regards this as a “questionable interpretation of legislation”79 and 
opines that since Ms. Murphy did not have an independent source of income for three 
years, the exercise of health board discretion should have been regarded as 
unreasonable. Whyte regards this decision as being “unduly differential to the position 
of the welfare authorities”80 in the exercise of their discretionary powers. 
 
 
 
IV 
Conclusion 
 
In both the Irish and British welfare systems, the theory that applies to both law based 
and discretionary income maintenance schemes is that “no merit is seen in provisions 
that maintain people at more than a subsistence level”81. The welfare system, neither 
in Britain nor Ireland, rarely concerns itself with being innovative or creative, whether 
the system is rule based or discretionary. Any scheme that has shown pioneering and 
inventive zeal, found itself continually constrained by legal rules, self-imposed 
bureaucratic guidelines or budget constraints. The right of appeal as regards 
discretionary payments is of a limited nature. As Titmuss outlines, “law and discretion 
are not separated by a sharp line but by overlapping zones”82. One thing is apparent, a 
measure of both discretion and welfare is a necessity in a modern day welfare system 
but ensuring the correct balance between rules and discretion is not always easily 
done and may simply be an unreachable aspiration.  
                                                 
79
 Ibid. 
80
 Ibid.  
81
 Bryson, L Welfare and the State: Who Benefits (Macmillan: Hampshire, 1992) at p. 56. For real to 
life examples of this see Kitty Holland “ Fran tries to keep smiling on €153 for family of seven” Irish 
Times, October 16th 2004. Fran, in this extract, explains what she buys her 7 year old daughter as a treat 
“She likes the brown bread, I suppose it’s the different taste ya see, but its 79 cent for a small loaf 
where youse get a large white slice in Aldi for 33 cent”. 
82
 Supra. fn. 2 p. 238 
